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A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INVESTMENT COMPANY
LEGISLATION*
Walter P. North**
I. Introduction and Scope
As its title implies, this article is devoted primarily to furnishing a brief,
but hopefully an accurate and reasonably complete, factual chronology of fed-
eral legislation and proposed legislation dealing with investment companies. In
addition, at least the more important background materials which are parts of
the legislative history in that area will be outlined. No pretense is made of
providing critical analyses or legal interpretations of any aspect of either existing
legislation or bills'which have been introduced in Congress from time to time but
failed to be enacted. Presumably, however, some apparent expressions of
views will result, at least impliedly, from the process of narrating this history.
Also, to a lesser extent the content, objectives and purposes of various bills de-
signed to provide regulation of the investment company industry will appear.'
II. Developments Prior to the Advent of the Original
Investment Company Bill
The Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
mark, of course, the beginning of securities legislation at the federal level, and, to
this day, they are the basic Acts covering the issuance and purchase and sale of
securities generally. It was recognized virtually from the start, however, that
these Acts were essentially designed to protect investments by the public in tra-
ditional types of securities, such as those commonly issued by commercial and
industrial corporations and sold to the public and traded on exchanges and in the
over-the-counter market. They were not geared to the protection of those who
invest in mutual funds or other types of investment companies. The full dis-
closure requirements and the antifraud provisions which are the basic concepts
on which the 1933 and 1934 Acts are founded do not, standing alone, provide
all of the types of protections needed in the investment company industry -
an industry which is made up essentially of large liquid pools of funds entrusted
* Editor's Note: At Mr. North's request, many of the references that would ordinarily
be contained in footnotes are included in the text of this article.
** Associate General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission; A.B. University of
Michigan, 1928; J.D. University of Michigan, 1930.
The author is very much indebted to Francis M. Divilio, a colleague of his in the Office
of the General Counsel, who has been a staff attorney at the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission since 1946 and who in recent years has devoted much of his time to legislative matters.
"Frank" has spent many hours on the spadework which necessarily precedes the publication
of an article such as this. While the author assumes full responsibility for everything stated
herein, he is deeply grateful to Frank for much helpful assistance.
1 To the extent that views are expressed in this article, they are solely those of the author.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for
any private publication by any of its employees and such publications do not necessarily reflect
the position of the Commission or of other members of its staff.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1964).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1964).
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by the investing public to investment companies and their managements for
investment in corporate enterprises, hopefully at a profit to the public investors.
The first true investment companies of any size in the United States were
formed in 1924. There was a fairly rapid increase in such companies, particularly
of the closed-end variety, during the next few years, but speculative frenzy in
the late 1920's, the market crash in November of 1929 and the depression in
the early 1930's combined to deal them a nearly fatal blow. As these events tran-
spired it became evident, at least by the mid-1930's, that there were evils, abuses
and deficiencies in the organization and operation of this industry which needed
to be ferreted out and dealt with in some effective manner which would restore
public confidence in the industry - a manner which would provide public in-
vestors with safeguards beyond those afforded by the first two federal securities
laws. Investment Companies 1968 contains a brief but, for present purposes,
adequate account of these developments.4 The specific abuses and shortcomings
which existed in the investment company industry during this period are recited
and documented throughout the reports and hearings which are hereinafter cited
and discussed.
The need for additional regulation directed to the particular problems then
existing in the investment company industry was recognized, or at least strongly
suspected, by Congress as early as 1935, the year in which it enacted the Public
Utility Holding Company Act.' Section 30 of that Act directed the Securities
and Exchange Commission to make a study of investment trusts and to report
to Congress the results of its study and its recommendations by January 4, 1937.6
This congressional mandate resulted in such an exhaustive study (commonly
called the Investment Trust Study) that it could not be completed and fully
reported to Congress by the date originally specified. Indeed, the Commission's
Report on the Investment Trust Study was submitted in several parts over a
period of time and was accompanied by six supplemental reports.7
4 ARTHUR WIESENBERGER SERVICES, INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1968 at 10-12 (1968).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1964).
6 The full text of the relevant portion of this section reads as follows:
The Commission is authorized and directed to make a study of the functions and
activities of investment trusts and investment companies, the corporate structures,
and investment policies of such trusts and companies, the influence exerted by such
trusts and companies upon companies in which they are interested, and the influence
exerted by interests affiliated with the management of such trusts and companies
upon their investment policies, and to report the results of its study and its recom-
mendations to the Congress on or before January 4, 1937. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1964).
7 Officially designated Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies, Part I of this Report was transmitted to Congress on
June 10, 1938 and was ordered printed as H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong. 2d Sess. (1938).
Most of the other parts and supplemental reports followed in 1939, and in early 1940 when
the first investment company bill (discussed infra) was introduced in Congress. (A table listing
all of the parts of the Report that were transmitted to Congress up to the time the Senate
Hearings on the original investment company bill began on April 2, 1940 and all six of the
supplemental reports, together with the date of transmission and the House Document Number
of each, is set forth in Hearings on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 307 [hereinafter cited as Hearings
or Senate Hearings].) However, chapter VII of part III of the Report (Abuses and Deficiencies
in the Organization and Operation of Investment Trusts and Investment Companies) was not
transmitted to Congress until February 24, 1941 - after the Investment Company Act was
passed and parts IV (Control and Influence Over Industry and Economic Significance of
Investment Companies) and V (Conclusion and Recommendations) were not transmitted
until June 9, 1941. These portions of the Report were printed as H.R. Doc. Nos. 136
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On a narrow view of what constitutes legislative history it can sometimes
be said that the history of a law does not begin until its first version is introduced
in Congress and hearings are commenced on it. Such a test would peg the
legislative history in this instance as starting March 14, 1940 when the original
version of a bill to regulate investment companies was simultaneously introduced
in both the Senate and the House of Representatives during the third session of
the seventy-sixth Congress (S. 3580 and H.R. 8935) and April 2, 1940 when the
Senate hearings began. (The record of those hearings is captioned Hearings on
S. 3580 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency
[hereinafter cited as Hearings or Senate Hearings].) Such a narrow view of legis-
lative history is, however, totally unrealistic with respect to the Investment
Company Act. At the latest its legislative history began when the Commission
conducted its Investment Trust Study and prepared and submitted to Congress
its voluminous Report and supplemental reports thereon.
Any attempt to summarize or outline in any detail the substance of such
an extensive Report and its supplements is beyond the scope of this article. Never-
theless, the importance of these documents as integral parts of the legislative his-
tory of the Investment Company Act cannot be overemphasized. They provide
the immediate backdrop for the initial investment company draft bill which the
Commission submitted to Congress and which, as just noted, was introduced in
both houses on March 14, 1940. It is also significant that these reports were
repeatedly cited and quoted throughout the hearings on the bill (discussed infra)
and are prominently referred to in the opening section of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 as finally enacted.' This section is entitled "Findings and
Declaration of Policy" and both of its subsections, (a) and (b), recite that they
are founded "[u]pon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and reports of the
Securities and Exchange Commission made pursuant to section 30 of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935" as well as on facts otherwise obtained.
Despite the limitations on this article which have just been noted,
attention is directed to the fact that many thousands of man-hours of
persons on the Commission staff were devoted to the Study and to
the ensuing Report. From start to finish this extensive project was con-
ducted under the guiding hand of the late Commissioner Robert E.
Healy, affectionately known to all as Judge Healy. He was one of the five
original Commissioners who took office when the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission was created in 1934 and he continued as a Commissioner until his death
in 1946. His tenure on the Commission was the longest in the thirty-five years
of its existence. Numerous members of the staff of the SEC (notably David
Schenker, who was Chief Counsel throughout the Investment Trust Study) made
major contributions, and they received a vast amount of information and assist-
ance from many people outside of the Commission who were knowledgeable in
and 246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). In a technical sense these parts of the Report may
not be a part of the legislative history of the Investment Company Act, which had become
law before they were transmitted to Congress. Nevertheless, they shed much light on the
aspects of the investment company industry problems with which they deal.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1964). This Act was approved on August 22, 1940 as
Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789.
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the investment company industry. Anyone who really wants to know the "whys
and wherefores" of the Investment Company Act must necessarily familiarize
himself with this Report and its supplements.
III. Steps in the Enactment of the Original
Investment Company Act of 1940
The draft bill which the Commission submitted to the seventy-sixth Con-
gress and which Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York9 introduced in the
Senate as S. 3580 on March 14, 1940 was entitled as a bill "[t]o provide for the
registration and regulation of investment companies .... " and for other pur-
poses not germane to this article."0 This bill was the original version or, perhaps
more accurately, the forerunner of the Investment Company Act of 1940. How-
ever denominated, original version or forerunner, the Commission's draft bill
which was introduced as S. 3580 underwent very material changes (a develop-
ment discussed infra) before the Investment Company Act of 1940 ultimately
emerged. Moreover, the bill which was later reported out on the Senate side
after lengthy hearings was not S. 3580 but a substitute bill, S. 4108, which em-
bodied the numerous intervening changes. In fact, though of historical interest
only, it was a House bill, not a Senate bill, which was finally enacted and ap-
proved by the President as Public Law Number 76-768 on August 22, 1940.1"
Nevertheless, by far the more significant part of the story of the enactment of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 [hereinafter the Act] unfolded on the Senate side
where the original and much more detailed hearings were held as a result of
which the Commission's original draft bill evolved into the ultimate Act. Indeed,
this evolution had already occurred before there were any hearings in the House
of Representatives and the hearings there were not much more than a formality
after the fact.
For the reasons just stated this article dwells largely on the Senate pro-
9 Senator Wagner was then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Securities and Exchange
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, the subcommittee which held the Senate
hearings on this bill.
10 Both S. 3580 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 as finally adopted contain
provisions which are not pertinent here. As to the latter this article is concerned only with
Title I, captioned "Investment Companies," 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1964), not
Title II covering "Investment Advisers," 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1964), or Title III
which was an amendment to section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h
(1964), dealing with the effective date of registration statements generally, not just those
covering investment company shares. Although the vast majority of investment companies
employ investment advisers, the Investment Advisers Act is not generally relevant for present
purposes because section 203(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(b) (2) (1964), of that Act exempts
from registration under it "any investment adviser whose only clients are investment com-
panies . . . . " The antifraud provisions of that Act as amended in 1960 (Act of Sept. 13,
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 8, 74 Stat. 887) do, however, apply to all investment advisers
including unregistered ones whose clients are investment companies. Investment Advisers Act
§ 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1964).
11 On the House side the counterpart of the original S. 3580 was H.R. 8935, but here
too the bill eventually reported out was a substitute, H.R. 10065, the counterpart of S. 4108.
S. 4108 was reported to the floor of the Senate without amendment. While H.R. 10065 was
reported on the House side with numerous amendments, most of these were technical and
clerical in nature, and it was this House bill, rather than its Senate counterpart, which was
ultimately enacted into Public Law Number 76-768, 54 Stat. 789.
[June, 1969]
[Vol. 44:677] FEDERAL INVESTMENT COMPANY LEGISLATION 681
ceedings, which led to the passage of the Act, not the House proceedings. For
the sake of completeness, however, the following developments on the House side
are noted briefly. The original House bill, H.R. 8935, introduced March 14,
1940, was supplanted by H.R. 10065, an exact counterpart of the substitute
Senate bill, S. 4108, which was forthcoming after the Senate hearings. House
committee hearings on H.R. 10065 were held on June 13 and 14, 1940. Hear-
ings on H.R. 10065 before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. This bill was reported out of com-
mittee to the floor of the House of Representatives with numerous, though mostly
non-substantive, amendments (H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess.) and,
as stated earlier, this bill eventually became the Act when the President approved
it on August 22, 1940.
Returning to the Senate, hearings were held by the Securities Subcommittee
of the Banking and Currency Committee for four virtually solid weeks in April
of 1940. In fact, between April 2 and April 26 there was only one weekday
when the hearings were not in session (parts I and II of the Hearings). Judge
Healy and Chief Counsel Schenker pulled the laboring oars for the Commission
and were ably and extensively assisted by other members of the Commission and
its staff and numerous written statements, memoranda and exhibits were put
into the record on behalf of the Commission. On the side of industry there
were dozens of witnesses and again many statements, memoranda and exhibits.
Without belittling the important role of many others it should be noted that
Alfred Jaretzld, Jr., Esquire, of New York City was lead counsel for the closed-
end investment companies (Hearings at 1107, 1130) which at that time rep-
resented more than half of the entire industry in terms of total assets though in
more recent years the open-end companies, the so-called mutual funds, have far
outdistanced the closed-end segment of the industry.12 Warren Motley, Esquire,
of Boston, Massachusetts, who originally testified only in his capacity as counsel
for Massachusetts Investors Trust, emerged as the principal spokesman for the
open-end companies. Hearings at 651, 1109.
Review of the entire contents of these hearings is beyond the scope of this
article but, like the Commission's Report on the Investment Trust Study, they
are a must for any serious student of the Act as well as for any attorney whose
clients have investment company problems. Without attempting to deal with
them substantively, two aspects of these hearings are noted as outstanding, if
not unique:
(1) They disclosed virtually no disagreement between industry
and the Commission on the question of the need for regulation of some
kind to curb abuses and correct deficiencies in the investment company
field.13
12 After 1929, closed ends lost much of their former favor with investors, but not
until 1944 did the aggregate assets of mutual funds exceed those of the closed-end
companies. By June 30, 1966, the assets of mutual funds were almost six times
those of the closed-end companies. On that date there were 379 mutual funds reg-
istered with the Commission, with total assets of approximately $38.2 billion, as
against 149 active closed-end companies with total assets of about $6.6 billion.
SEC, REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
GROWTr, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1966).
13 Near the close of the April 26 session of the hearings, which was the last session at
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(2) They led to a jointly sponsored bill which had the firm en-
dorsement of both the Commission and the industry.'
The first of these two points must not be over-read. Although practically
everyone acknowledged that the industry was plagued with ills, indeed with evils
and abuses in some instances, and that some measure of regulation was necessary
to protect public investors and restore public confidence, the hearings brought
out a wide divergence of views as to the nature and extent of the regulation
required to cure those ills. The extent of this difference of opinion is reflected,
in part at least, by the changes which evolved between the introduction of the
Commission's original draft bill as S. 3580 and the Act as finally approved.
A Note in an issue of the Yale Law Journal which was published soon after the
passage of the Act recites what happened in this regard rather aptly and
succinctly. After observing that some extremists thought that "[t]he whole in-
vestment company industry was a parasite" which presumably should be abol-
ished, this Note continues:
While it was never seriously proposed to outlaw investment companies
entirely, the original bill for federal regulation, submitted by the SEC to
Congress last March, surpassed even the Holding Company Act in grants
of discretionary power to the Commission. Whether it would have been
politically possible to pass the bill in its original form is questionable. At
any rate, the present Act is a drastic modification, rewritten entirely by the
Commission and the industry, and passed by Congress without debate as a
tribute to the cooperative spirit which fathered it. Where the original draft
left the Commission with power by rule and regulation to implement the
broad policies of the bill, the present Act generally sets certain maxima of
regulation, leaving in the Commission a discretionary power only to exempt
and minimize.1 5
Near the end of the May 31st session of the hearings, Mr. Schenker indicated
"broadly what are the differences between the revised proposals and the orig-
inal proposals." Hearings at 1110-22. Subject to cautionary considerations this
testimony is helpful in understanding the principal changes. It is interspersed,
however, with colloquy in which he was drawn into discussing aspects of the bill
other than changes from its original version and, to the extent that there were
a few changes even after May 31, his testimony is not to be relied upon. In this
latter category, for example, is his discussion of the rule-making provisions of the
bill which were altered after that date. Hearings at 1120-22.
which witnesses were called to testify, Judge Healy who had been present throughout the
hearings remarked: "I have heard but one witness, out of all those who appeared here, who
went on the witnesss stand and said that there should be no regulation." Hearings at 1051.
14 At the May 31 session of the hearings, in announcing that agreement had been reached
between the industry and the SEC as to recommendations to be made to the subcommittee,
Judge Healy said: "[Als the bill is now written it has the endorsement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and it has the endorsement of the industry." Hearings at 1106. Mr.
Jaretzki, who followed Judge Healy, stated on behalf of the closed-end companies that "I
want to endorse thoroughly everything that Judge Healy has said." Id. at 1107. He also
remarked that "we feel that this bill is not only a workable bill, but a bill which is a good
thing for the industry. We would like very much to see it passed, and we hope very much
that it can be passed at this session." Id. at 1109. Mr. Motley, who followed Mr. Jaretzki, ex-
pressed his "complete endorsement of everything that has been said, both by Judge Healy,
and Mr. Jaretzki." Id. at 1109.
15 Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE L. J. 440, 442-43 (1941).
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Turning to the second outstanding aspect of the hearings - the emergence
of a bill sponsored by both the industry and the Commission - it has frequently
been said in the corridors of the SEC and by old timers in the legal profession
who had a hand in fashioning it back in 1940 that the Act became a reality
only because the Senate Subcommittee which considered the original bill, in
effect, "knocked heads together" and forewarned that if there were to be any
investment company legislation during the seventy-sixth Congress it would have
to have the endorsement of both industry and government. There appears, how-
ever, to be little or no recorded legislative history to justify this position.
Perusal of the record of the April hearings which are in excess of one
thousand pages discloses a generally congenial atmosphere as between witnesses
for the Commission and for the industry. As indicated earlier, however, there was
a wide divergence of views throughout the April sessions. Perhaps even more
significantly, this.record does not appear to contain any testimony from anyone
on either side or any suggestion from any member of the Subcommittee which
specifically stated that they should try to or could get together to agree on a
jointly sponsored bill. Indeed, as of the close of the April 26th session the
Subcommittee did not adjourn temporarily or go into recess to permit industry
and Commission representatives to confer. On the contrary, after the last witness
had been heard that afternoon, Senator James H. Hughes, who was then pre-
siding in the absence of Chairman Wagner, announced simply: "The hearings are
closed. If there is a further meeting the chairman will call it." Hearings at 1059.
Finally, when Chairman Wagner submitted the Subcommittee's Report recom-
mending enactment of S. 4108, he wrote on the opening page:
Almost immediately after the conclusion of the hearings, representatives
of the investment companies and of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion advised the chairman of the subcommittee that they believed it might
be possible for them to reach a common ground and to submit a joint
recommendation as to the scope and provisions of the bill. The chairman
encouraged them in this endeavor, and as a result of their cooperative
efforts, the substitute bill (S. 4108) was drafted.16
Thus again there was no reference to the fact that resolution of differences had
been urged from Senate sources. However, one must not be so naive as to
overlook the possibility that in an area such as this at least a little something and
perhaps a lot may have gone on "off the record." This possibility finds some
support in a statement made after the fact, namely, in the final part V of the
Commission's Report on the Investment Trust Study which, as noted earlier,
was transmitted to Congress June 9, 1941, nearly a year after the Act had become
law. After relating that there were extensive Senate hearings and vigorous
industry opposition to some features of the original bill, this portion of the
Report states on page 383:
The Banking Committee suggested that the Commission and the investment
company industry work out a measure which would be acceptable to both
the Commission and the industry. Such a bill was prepared and was jointly
16 S. REP. No. 1775. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
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recommended by the Commission and the industry for passage by the
Congress.
Whether the jointly sponsored bill was prompted by Senate suggestion or
was solely the spontaneous result of the desire of industry and the Commission
to secure mutually acceptable legislation, it was assuredly an amazing ac-
complishment. Indeed, at least one member of the Subcommittee, Senator
Sheridan Downey, found it very difficult to believe that such a thing had hap-
pened. Near the close of the last day of the hearings the following colloquy
occurred:
Senator DOWNEY. Do I understand that the representatives of the invest-
ment trusts and of the Securities and Exchange Commission are virtually
in agreement now?
Senator WAGNER. Not virtually but actually in agreement.
Senator DOWNEY. That is a most amazing thing in this chaotic world right
now.
Senator WAGNER. I think it is.
Senator DOWNEY. It is really the first encouraging thing I have heard in
several weeks. How was this miracle brought about? Hearings at 1130.
One final observation about the original Act stems from this very unusual
manner in which it came into being, namely by agreement between the industry
which was to be regulated by the remedial provisions of the Act and the govern-
ment agency which was to administer those provisions and, when necessary, to
enforce them against members of that very industry. That singular background
has led to conflicting arguments that have been urged by legal advocates and
adopted by courts in construing the Act. This has gone on for over twenty-eight
years in instances too numerous to cite, but the principal thread of the opposing
positions may be stated briefly. On the one side it is argued that the Act is
remedial in character and is a marked extension of the concepts underlying the
earlier federal securities laws enacted in 1933 and 1934 which proved to be
inadequate in the investment company field and that this Act should accordingly
be construed broadly to accomplish its remedial purpose of affording adequate
protections for public investors in that particular field. The argument to the
contrary is that it is ridiculous to assume that representatives of the industry to
be regulated by the Act would ever consent to broad sweeping restrictions and
prohibitions and that this position is supported by the fact that the harsh regu-
latory pattern of the Commission's original draft bill was very materially watered
down by extensive compromise to which the Commission had to agree in order
to secure industry's concurrence in the Act."
17 A single example of these contrasting views is presented by two leading cases in this
area. In Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (January 1961), when considering
whether the Act should be construed to provide implied causes of action, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit quoted from the statement of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on the
floor of the Senate on June 21, 1940:
This bill . . . was agreed upon after very painstaking and careful study, in
which really almost a miracle occurred . . . an agreement which is embodied in this
bill was reached between those engaged in the industry and the members of the
S.E.C. I submit that that is a very unusual and very beneficial occurrence-. Id.
at 912.
The opinion then concluded that "[i]t seems improbable that there would have been such
[June, 1969]
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IV. Amendments to the Act Since 1940
Difficult as it may be to realize that the Act ever came into being in the
manner in which it did in 1940, it seems equally incredible that this Act has
never been substantively amended in any really significant way during the in-
tervening twenty-eight to twenty-nine years. Lack of any very noteworthy amend-
ments is particularly hard to understand in view of the compromise nature of
the original Act which would seem to suggest that it might well prove to be in-
adequate in ways which would require substantial amendments. Nevertheless,
Congress has seen fit to amend it in only a few respects which are largely technical
in character or at most procedural rather than substantive. In the interest of
completeness, however, all of these amendments are here listed, but without
discussion except in the few instances in which a substantive aspect of the Act
appears to be affected to at least some extent. On a section-by-section basis the
amendments to the Act are as follows:
1. Section 2(a) (30) was amended in 1954 so that "prospectus"
as used in section 22 means a written prospectus such as is required by
section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 s rather than by Section
5 (b) of that Act,"9 as stated in the original Investment Company Act.
Act of Aug. 10, 1954, PUB. L. No. 83-577, 68 Stat. 683, 689. The
original reference to section 5(b) instead of to section 10(a) of the
Securities Act is believed to have been an inadvertent error. Section
5(b) prohibits the use of the mails or interstate facilities to transmit
a prospectus relating to a registered security "unless such prospectus
meets the requirements of section 10" or to transmit a security pur-
suant to a sale thereof unless it is "accompanied or preceded by a
prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10,"
unanimity for the passage of the Act if it had been thought to impose any such per se liability
on directors as is claimed by plaintiffs here." Id. at 912. About two months later in Brown
v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (March 1961), District Judge William B. Herlands of the
Southern District of New York noted this view in Brouk and said: "This court is in respectful
disagreement with the views expressed in the Brouk case to the extent that they restrictively
interpret the 1940 Act. The opinion herein articulates the basis for such divergence." Id. at
247. Elsewhere in his opinion Judge Herlands further refuted the view that "the Act was a'compromise' accepted by the industry and that industry would not voluntarily submit to such
duty or to such a cause of action." Id., n.1 at 240. He also went on to say that
The indifference to federal civil liability for "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust"
attributed by defendants to Congress cannot be reconciled with the emphatically
expressed purpose of Congress to eliminate those very evils and to protect investors
against those very abuses. Id. at 246.
Although noted here primarily to illustrate arguments made by advocates and reasoning
used by courts in construing this so-called "compromise" Act, what subsequently happened
in these two cases may be of interest. Judge Herlands' decision in Brown was affirmed on
appeal, on narrower grounds in certain respects, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), but the upper
court nevertheless noted that it did not necessarily regard Brouk as distinguishable from this
case and stated that "[slo far as it is not, we must respectfully disagree, to the extent in-
dicated herein." Id. at 422. Meantime certiorari was granted in Brouk, 366 U.S. 958 (1961),
but before the case was argued there was a settlement between the parties which prompted the
Supreme Court to vacate as moot the decision below, 369 U.S. 424 (1962). Later, after the
Supreme Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), rejected the principle of
Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956) - the case on which the Brouk court had
principally relied - the Eighth Circuit in Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783
(1967), virtually acknowledged that its decision in Brouk was no longer sound law. Id. at 793.
18 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1964).
19 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
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but does not purport to prescribe what shall be contained in a prospectus.
It is section 10, headed "Information Required in Prospectus," which
performs that function. Thus, this amendment merely corrected what
was apparently a technical error in the drafting of the original Act.2
2. Section 2(a) (37) and section 6(a) (1) were amended to elimi-
nate references to the territories of Alaska and Hawaii when they were
admitted to statehood. Act of June 25, 1959, PuB. L. No. 86-70, 73
Stat. 141, 143; Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-624, 74 Stat.
411, 412. References to the Philippine Islands in these two sections
have also been eliminated, but their elimination was by Presidential
Proclamation Number 2695, effective July 4, 1946, granting inde-
pendence to the Philippines, and not by statutory amendment.
3. Section 3(c) (4), a provision in the original Act which ex-
empted bank holding company affiliates of the types therein described
from being investment companies within the meaning of the Act, was
repealed in 1966. Act of July 1, 1966, PUB. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat.
236, repealing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (4) (1964),reported at 15 U.S.C. §
80a-3 (c) (4) (Supp. III, 1968). This amendment was but one part of a
bill (H.R. 7371) which was designed to strengthen the Bank Holding
Company Act of 195621 in numerous respects. Its details axe not relevant
here but may be explored by reference to the Senate Report of the Bank-
ing and Currency Committee on H.R. 7371, which is S. REP. No. 1179,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). (This Report is reproduced in 1966 US.
Code Cong. & Adm. News 2385.)
4. Section 3(c)(13) was amended in 1942 by adding to the
reference contained therein to section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code
the words "as amended." Act of Oct. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753,
56 Stat. 798.
5. Sections 8(e) and 40(a) were amended in 1960 to authorize
the use of certified mail (which did not exist in 1940), as well as
registered mail, in giving notice under those sections of the Act. Act
of June 11, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-507, 74 Stat. 200.
6. Section 18 was amended in 1958 by the addition of a sub-
section (k) which exempted from certain provisions of that section
of the Act "investment companies operating under the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958" (Act of July 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536,
72 Stat. 384) which had just been approved on July 18, 1958. This
amendment (Act of Aug. 21, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 690)
reflects an apparent belief by Congress that certain provisions of section
18 of the Act did not need to apply to a company that was both an
investment company and a small business investment company in
20 The House Report suggests that this amendment was "for purposes of clarity and
simplification." H.R. REP. No. 1542 oN S. 2846, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in
1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2973, 3002. From a realistic viewpoint, however, it is
difficult to regard this amendment as anything except a correction of an error in drafts-
manship.
21 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1964).
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view of the extensive manner in which the Small Business Administra-
tion Act of 1953 was rewritten by the 1958 Act.22
7. Section 24 was amended in 1954 by adding what is now the last
sentence of subsection (d) and by adding all of Subsection (e). Act
of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-577, 68 Stat. 683. This was a truly
substantive amendment though of somewhat limited scope. For present
purposes it may be stated briefly, but perhaps not too precisely, that
the effect of the addition to subsection (d) is to require the use of a
prospectus by dealers in investment company shares offered on a con-
tinuous basis over a period of time longer than is required for other
types of securities, except to the extent that the Commission may relax
this requirement by prescribing rules. The addition of subsection (e) to
section 24 was probably the most significant substantive amendment
which has thus far been enacted. It was a boon to a very wide segment
of issuers, underwriters and dealers in investment company shares, not
to mention the staff of the Commission. Indeed, it applies to all re-
deemable securities issued by open-end management companies (which
constitute by far the major part of the whole industry) and by unit
investment trusts as well as to all securities issued by face-amount
certificate companies. The original Act called for registration of invest-
ment company shares in compliance with the registration provisions
under the 1933 Act. That pattern of registration requirements was
tailored to fit the registration of securities by typical commercial and
industrial corporations which ordinarily issue a separate block of stock
each time they wish to raise additional equity capital and it proved to
be highly burdensome and unwieldy when applied to continuous offerings
by investment companies. Through a combination of staff ingenuity and
industry cooperation in voluntarily entering into various undertakings,
an administrative practice, the details of which are not important here,
was devised which afforded considerable relief from an otherwise
virtually intolerable situation. It was not until the advent of subsec-
tion (e), however, that there was any statutory basis for registering
continuous offerings in a manner specifically geared to their character-
istics and yet assuring protections to the investing public comparable to
those afforded by the 1933 Act registration system. This subsection
provides simply and in essence that the original registration of a con-
tinuous offering may remain in effect quite indefinitely, provided it is
updated periodically by the filing of appropriate amendments and the
payment of additional registration fees as the amount of the securities
covered by that registration is increased from time to time.2"
8. Section 43 was amended in 1949 to change the original ref-
erence to "circuit court of appeals" to read "court of appeals." Act
of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, 63 Stat. 89. This section was
22 Though not pertinent here, the legislative history of this development may be examined
by reference to 1958 US. Code Cong. & Adm. News 3071.
23 For further details, see H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in
1954 US. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2973, 3002-04.
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further amended in 1958 as to certain procedural steps which follow
the filing of a court petition for review of an order of the Commission.
Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-791, 72 Stat. 941.
9. Section 46(b) has been directly and indirectly amended by a
number of subsequent developments which are not of any particular
interest here. Suffice it to state that this is the section which originally
empowered the Commission to hire and fix the salaries of certain person-
nel needed to administer the Act "without regard to the provisions of other
laws" and to hire and fix the salaries of other necessary officers and
employees subject to the then existing civil service laws, including the
Classification Act of 1923, as amended. The civil service concepts of
what government employees belong to what categories, both grade-wise
and salary-wise, have been enlarged and changed very materially since
1940. Some of these changes supersede pro tanto earlier provisions of
various laws such as those contained in the original text of section 46(b)
of the Act. See, e.g., the Classification Act of 1949, Act of Oct. 28,
1949, Pub. L. No. 81-429, 63 Stat. 972.
It is apparent from a quick glance at the above numbered items that item 5
and the 1958 amendment in item 8 are procedural, that item 9 is a matter of
internal operation of the Commission, and that all of the rest are technical
changes - except items 3, 6 and 7 which do have some, but not really a very
extensive, effect on the substance of the Act. This paucity of truly significant
changes in a period of nearly twenty-nine years, remarkable as it may be, should
not be regarded as indicating that there is no room for improvement in the Act.
Indeed, certain intervening studies which are next considered were designed in
large part to uncover its possible shortcomings.
V. Recent Studies in the Investment Company Area
Investment companies, particularly mutual funds, grew rapidly after the
Act was passed in 1940,2" and the Commission had its hands full in trying to
administer and enforce it adequately.2 5 Factors such as these may account at least
partially for the fact that until 1958 no comprehensive study was made with a
24 The Commission's 24th Annual Report to Congress (covering the fiscal year which
ended June 30, 1958) contains a table which shows that the estimated aggregate market value
of the assets of all investment companies registered with the Commission on June 30, 1941
(the close of the first fiscal year during which the Act was in effect) was $2Y2 billion and
that by June 30, 1958 this value had burgeoned to $17 billion. SEC, 24th ANNUAL REPORT
147 (1959).
25 The Commission's REPORT, supra note 24, at 148 recites that "the Commission has
initiated a regular program for the periodical inspection of investment companies" under which
nine companies were inspected in fiscal 1957 and seven were inspected in 1958. With 453
companies registered at the close of the latter year and at the average rate of eight inspections
a year, it would have taken over fifty-six years to complete one cycle of inspections of all
investment companies. This presents a shuddering contrast with inspections of national banks
and federal savings and loan associations, all of which were then, as now, audited once each
year. It is all the more shocking in view of the ease with which the very liquid assets of
investment companies, if improvidently managed, can dwindle away in one fashion or another
while banks and savings and loan associations are restricted to investing in assets which are
considerably more stable.
[June, 1969]
[Vol. 44:677] FEDERAL INVESTMENT COMPANY LEGISLATION 689
view to evaluating the effectiveness of the Act or discovering ways in which to
improve it.
In 1958 the Commission requested the Securities Research Unit of the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania
to make a study of mutual funds and to report the results to the Commission.
This was done under section 14(b) of the Act which grants the Commission
authority to study and investigate certain aspects of the investment company
industry whenever it "deems that any substantial further increase in the size of
investment companies creates any problem involving the protection of investors
or the public interest." As this study progressed, certain practices and develop-
ments were revealed which led to enlargement of its scope. As a result, it was
not completed and the report on it was not transmitted to the Commission until
August 9, 1962. The Commission, in turn, transmitied the report to Congress
where it was printed as a House Report. H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962). This report is commonly referred to as the Wharton School
Report and its scope and depth are indicated, in some small measure at least,
by the fact that it is nearly 600 pages in length. Large portions of it are required
reading for anyone who desires not only to understand what happened in the
mutual fund field in the first twenty years that the Act was in effect but also
to appraise what may need to be done to strengthen its effectiveness. It also
contains a major part of the legislative history of recent unsuccessful attempts
to amend the Act in various substantive ways, a subject discussed later.
The next, in fact an overlapping, development in this area originated with
the adoption of H.J. Res. 438, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., which was approved on
September 5, 1961 as Public Law Number 87-196, 75 Stat. 465. This was in
the form of an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It added
subsection (d) to section 19 of that Act,26 which authorized the Commission to
make a study of the "adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of
national securities exchanges and national securities associations."27 A special
staff was set up to devote full time to this study and the report on it. Portions
of the exhaustive report, which is known as the Report of the Special Study of
Securities Markets or, more briefly, the Special Study Report, were transmitted
to Congress on April 3, 1963. Other parts followed on July 17 and August 8,
26 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1965).
27 The study was much more far-reaching than this reference to "rules" would seem to
call for, but its wide scope had the full blessing of Congress. Congressman Peter F. Mack,
Jr., the author of H.J. Res. 438, the "Mack Resolution," which became the new subsection
(d) of section 19 of the Exchange Act, may have been prompted to cast his resolution in
terms of the adequacy of rules because his resolution came at a time when a Commission
investigation of the American Stock Exchange had just revealed apparent inadequacies in its
rules. Nevertheless, Congressman Mack had in mind from the start something "very broad"
in scope, the subject matter being "extremely wide in breadth." The House Report recom-
mending passage of the Mack Resolution, a report which was submitted by Mr. Mack himself
who was then Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee, makes these matters entirely clear. H.R. REP. No.
882, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). If there were ever any doubts that others also shared
Congressman Mack's views as to the broad areas which this study was to encompass, they
were dispelled by both the Senate and House Reports about a year later. S. REP. No. 1703,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1778, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). At that
time the deadline for reporting on the study was extended by three months and the money
appropriated for conducting it was increased to $950,000. Act of July 27, 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-561, 76 Stat. 247.
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1963. This entire report is printed as H.R. Doc. No. 95, pts. 1 to 4, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. In September of that year the Commission submitted to Congress the
Special Study's "Summaries, Conclusions and Recommendations," and in July
of 1964 it submitted a detailed index of the entire report. These were printed
as parts 5 and 6 of the same House Document and are particularly helpful since
the report proper contains nearly 3,000 pages.
Unlike the Wharton School Report, which dealt only with the mutual fund
segment of investment companies, the Special Study Report is concerned with
the securities markets as they relate to all types of securities, not just investment
company shares. For that reason many parts of it have no direct relevance here.
However, very considerable portions of it are of much interest in the investment
company field and it has often been cited and referred to in hearings and
reports on investment company bills which have been before Congress since it was
submitted. By reference to the chapter headings, the summaries and the index
it is not too difficult to ascertain what portions of the Report are germane to
various aspects of legislation involving investment companies. The pertinent
areas on which the Special Study Report dwells most extensively are sales of
mutual fund shares, particularly sales methods and practices, and the so-called
"front-end load" on periodic payment plans for accumulating mutual fund
shares.
Valuable as both of them are, neither of the above reports represents the
work or the conclusions of the Commission itself. 8 It is for this reason, among
others, that a third and later report is generally considered to be the most signif-
icant document in the investment company area since the Commission's report
on the original investment trust study which preceded the passage of the 1940
Act. Officially known as the Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, (H.R. REP.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)), it is often referred to as the Investment
Company Growth Study or, more briefly, the Growth Study. Like the earlier
Wharton School Study, this study was undertaken under section 14(b) of the
Act. As will become evident in the next part of this article, this Growth Study
is also a sine qua non for any real understanding of the most recent attempts to
secure further investment company legislation.
VI. Unsuccessful Attempts to Amend the 1940 Act
As noted earlier (pages 685-88) the Act has been amended in sev-
eral respects since 1940 but few of these amendments were substantive to
any significant extent. Although all amendments, even strictly technical ones,
28 As to the Special Study, this was changed somewhat when Congressman Oren Harris,
Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, wrote a letter
dated April 5, 1963 requesting an indication of the Commission's views on the conclusions
and recommendations of its Special Study staff which had thus far reported to Congress.
William L. Cary, Chairman of the Commission, responded to this request by a letter dated
April 19, 1963. As further parts of the report were submitted to Congress, Chairman Cary
expressed the Commission's views on them in two subsequent letters dated July 23, 1963 and
August 8, 1963. All four of these letters are reproduced in a supplement to part 5 of the
Report. H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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were set forth in that portion of this article because they represent actual changes
in" the law, the instant part of this article does not purport to be exhaustive as to
all unsuccessful attempts to amend the Act by bills which have been introduced
between 1940 and now. On the contrary, except for passing references largely
in footnotes, only the major efforts in that area will be discussed here.
The first bill to amend the Act which obtained enough support even to be
reported out of committee29 was H.R. 2481, introduced at the first session of
the eighty-sixth Congress on January 15, 1959 by Congressman Oren Harris."0
This bill would have defined certain terms used in the Act, redefined and en-
larged the scope of other terms and clarified the meaning of still others. It also
would have further restricted assets which qualify for a diversified company,
prohibited change in or deviation from any investment policy without stockholder
approval and made numerous technical amendments. This bill was not only
reported out by the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee (H.R. REP.
No. 2178) but was passed on the floor of the House and transmitted to the Senate
where it died in committee.
The next bill which made equal progress was S. 3772, which was introduced
at the second session of the eighty-sixth Congress on June 29, 1960 by Senator Har-
rison Williams. It would have clarified certain exceptions from the Act, defined
certain of its terms, increased the requirements for statements of policy as to certain
types of mutual funds, enlarged the scope of the requirement of "bank custody"
and imposed additional limitations on investments which diversified companies and
face-amount companies are permitted to make. This bill was reported out by
the Banking and Currency Committee (S. REP. No. 1759) and was passed by
the Senate and transmitted to the House where it died in committee.
It was not until the ninetieth Congress, to which attention will be turned
shortly, that any other bill to amend the Act ever got out of committee, although
one such bill was introduced later in the second session of the eighty-sixth Con-
gress (H.R. 13041), three were introduced during the first session of the eighty-
seventh Congress (H.R. 2799; S. 1117, a counterpart of 2799; and H.R. 6591)
and one was introduced in the second session of the eighty-seventh Congress
(H.R. 11410). The eighty-eighth and eighty-ninth Congresses were even less
29 Earlier bills which died in committee included: H.R. 4344, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941); H.R. 6668, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. 11129 and S. 3915, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1956); and S. 2769, H.R. 9329 and H.R. 9387, 85th Cong., 1st Sess (1957). H.R.
4344 would have amended other securities acts much more extensively than the Investment
Company Act, but it would have had a substantial impact on companies registered under this
latter Act even with respect to the changes which it would have effected in some of the other
acts. H.R. 6668 would have increased the ceiling for exemption of closed-end companies from
$100,000 to $300,000. H.R. 11129 and S. 3915 were companion omnibus bills sponsored by
the Commission which would have made numerous amendments to three of the other federal
securities laws both to strengthen them substantively and to clarify and improve them tech-
nically. These bills are included here only for the sake of completeness since they did contain
a few, largely technical, proposed amendments to the Investment Company Act. All three of
the remaining bills, listed above as being introduced in the 85th Congress, first session, were
counterparts of each other and again represented a Commission-sponsored program. In this
case, however, the program was one to amend only the Investment Company Act, not other
securities acts, in several ways, some of which were substantive and others purely technical. In
substantial part, but not in toto, these three bills were like H.R. 2481 and S. 1181 introduced
in the first session of the 86th Congress, the contents of which are next outlined briefly in the
text.
30 S. 1181, a counterpart of this House bill, was introduced in the Senate on February 26,
1959, but was never reported out of committee.
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active in this area. No investment company bills were introduced in the eighty-
ninth Congress and in the eighty-eighth Congress the only bills which would
have altered the Act were directed primarily to providing additional regulation
of small business investment companies (SBICs) and bank collective investment
funds in which so-called managing agency accounts are pooled. The aim of
these bills was to strengthen and enlarge the pattern of regulation, by the Small
Business Administration in the one case and by the Comptroller of the Currency
in the other, sufficiently and in such ways as would presumably warrant ex-
empting such companies and funds from the federal securities laws including the
1940 Act, as to which a specific exemption was to have been provided for SBICs
and bank collective investment funds."
Oddly enough, the attempt to amend which came closest to succeeding and
yet failed - it was halted only by Presidential veto - was not a frontal attack on
the Act but rather a bill to amend the District of Columbia life insurance laws.
After losing the final round in test litigation in which the Supreme Court held
that a variable annuity contract is a security, thus making the issuer of such
annuities an investment company which would have to register under the Act, 2
one such company (VALIC) which was organized under the laws of the District
of Columbia decided to seek relief in Congress. It had a bill introduced to
amend the District's insurance laws so as to relieve such companies which are
incorporated in the District of Columbia from certain aspects of the Act which
were asserted to be unduly burdensome and difficult to comply with without
running afoul of requirements in insurance laws. The bill was H.R. 7482, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., introduced June 6, 1961. It would have had the indirect effect
of amending the Act to the competitive advantage of such District of Columbia
companies as against those organized under the laws of any of the states. It
would also have been detrimental to variable annuitants who purchased their
contracts from a District of Columbia company since they would be deprived
of the protections of the Act. Were it not for the unique fact that Congress is
the law-making body both for the United States and for the District of Columbia,
this kind of situation would never have arisen but it did, and both houses of
Congress passed the bill and sent it to the President for his approval. The Com-
mission recommended that the President veto the bill and he did so on September
26, 1961.2
VII. Mutual Fund Reform Bills in the Ninetieth Congress
The ninetieth Congress was the first Congress to convene after all three
of the studies and reports discussed above had been completed. Although the
last of these reports (covering the Investment Company Growth Study) was
not submitted to Congress and ordered printed until December 2, 1966, by the
31 The bills which would have exempted SBICs from the Act were two companion bills,
H.R. 2422 and S. 1427, both introduced in the 88th Congress, first session. The proposed
exemption for bank collective investment funds was contained in H.R. 8499, S. 2223 and
H.R. 9410, three identical bills which were also introduced in the first session of the 88th
Congress.
32 SEC v. VALIC, 359 U.S. 65 (1959). The decisions below had been to the contrary.
See 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958) and 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C., 1957).
33 The President's veto message appears as H.R. Doc: No. 244, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961), reprinted in 107 CONG. RaE. 21486 (1961).
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time the ninetieth Congress convened in January, 1967, the Commission was
already preparing draft legislation to implement recommendations contained in
that report. The Commission's draft bill was introduced simultaneously and in
identical form in both the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 1,
1967.'4 In fact, two identical bills were introduced in the House as well as one
in the Senate. These were S. 1659, H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess."s Hearings were held in both houses. On the Senate side, lengthy hearings
were conducted before the Banking and Currency Committee starting July 31,
1967 and continuing through additional sessions on six days in August. "6 On
the House side, the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee held hearings that started on October 10,
1967 and continued for eight subsequent days that month. Like those on the
Senate side, these hearings were of an exhaustive character.37 Except for a one
day hearing that was held on November 16, 1967, before the Banking and Cur-
rency Committee on an amendment dealing with the subject of bank "Com-
mingled Management Agency Accounts," there was no further formal action in
either congressional body during the first session of the ninetieth Congress.
When the second session convened in January of 1968, Congressman John
E. Moss promptly introduced an amended version of the bills which had been
considered during the first session. His bill, H.R. 14742, was introduced on
January 22, 1968. This bill was referred to the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee where hearings were held on it before the Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance on March 14 and 15, 1968. Again, however, there
was no further formal action in the House of Representatives. On the Senate
side, S. 3724 was introduced on July 1, 1968. This, too was an amended or
revised version of the earlier bills.
The record of developments with respect to investment company legislation
then pending indicates that there was at all times a friendly cooperative attitude
between the industry and the Commission as well as a recognition on the part
of the former that rather extensive amendments to this twenty-eight-year-old
34 The introduction of these bills was presaged by the President's Message to Congress
on February 16, 1967 on "Protecting the American Consumer," in which he stated that the
"spectacular growth of the mutual fund industry is an indication of its popularity" with in-
vestors including those "of modest means." He noted the "thoughtful and exhaustive" analysis
contained in the Commission's Growth Study Report which was submitted to Congress "two
months ago" and said: "I urge the Congress to give careful consideration to the report and
recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission." This portion of the President's
Message is printed as H.R. Doc. No. 57, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 113 CONG. REa.
3529 (Feb. 16, 1967).
35 Quite understandably both Congressman Harley 0. Staggers, Chairman of the House
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and Congressman John E. Moss, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of that Committee, wished to share in spon-
soring this proposed legislation which probably accounts for the fact thit the former in-
troduced H.R. 9510 on the same day that the latter introduced H.R. 9511, an identical bill.
On the Senate side S. 1659 was, equally understandably, introduced by Senator John J.
Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee.
36 Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967). The exhaustive nature of these hearings is apparent from the printed record
of them which is in excess of 1200 pages, and from the fact that approximately 70 witnesses
testified and supplied supporting documents while numerous other interested parties submitted
statements, letters and data for the record.
37 Hearings on H.R. 9510, 9511 Before a Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 90-21 (1967).
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Act were needed. There were, nevertheless, many important areas in which there
were divergent views. The process of resolving these many differences resulted
in changes in the bill so numerous and extensive in both houses of Congress that
new "clean" bills such as H.R. 14742 and S. 3724 were apparently felt to be
preferable to retaining the original bills with a multitude of proposed amend-
ments tacked on to them. The new S. 3724 was immediately sent to the floor
of the Senate without further hearings and with no amendments on July 1
(S. R.p. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968)) and after certain floor amend-
ments it was passed by the Senate on July 26, 1968 and transmitted to the House
where it died in committee.
The foregoing is admittedly a rather sketchy account of the legislative history
of what came to be known informally in the ninetieth Congress as the "Mutual
Fund Reform Bill." Arguably at least, this history of the first major effort to
"reform" the Act which had been on the books for twenty-eight years might
seem to deserve a somewhat fuller recital of its details. Exhaustive treatment is,
however, out of the question here and the above will perhaps suffice to assist
a practitioner who desires to probe the legislative history in this area in finding his
way around fairly readily, and, after all, that is perhaps the principal justification
for an article of this kind. Moreover, further demonstration of the importance of
these developments in the ninetieth Congress will probably be accomplished most
effectively by turning to a thumbnail sketch of what this reform bill was all about
substantively, despite the fact that the thrust of this article has thus far been, and
must continue to be, principally to narrate legislative history rather than to dwell
upon the substance of the law in the investment company field.
The foremost objective of the bill was to protect the rapidly increasing
number of public investors, who were entrusting larger and larger amounts of
their savings to mutual funds, against excessive or unreasonable fees and charges.
The bill struck at this problem in three ways which are here mentioned in terms
of the version of the bill ultimately passed by the Senate (S. 3724), though brief
parenthetical references to the original version recommended by the Commis-
sion are also made to illustrate the contrast. First, the bill would have required
that all compensation which was to be paid to an investment adviser, officer,
director or controlling person or principal underwriter (or to affiliates of any
of them) for services to a registered investment company be "reasonable" as
measured by specified standards. The courts, not the Commission, were to judge
the reasonableness in suits brought by the Commission or, if the Commission
failed to act within six months after a written request, in actions brought by
private litigants derivatively or representatively on behalf of investment com-
panies or their shareholders. Such suits were to be subject to numerous restric-
tions and limitations not detailed here. (The Commission's original proposal
included more extensive standards of reasonableness which on the whole tended
to be more favorable to investors. It also provided that actions for recovery could
be brought by shareholders without first requesting the Commission to sue, and
provided less stringent restrictions on suits by both stockholders and the Com-
mission.) Second, sales commissions to be paid by purchasers of shares were to
be regulated and limited under the existing industry-government framework of
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self-regulation in conformity with standards which included "reasonableness to
investors." (The original bill included a flat maximum ceiling on all sales
commissions of five per cent subject only to discretionary authority in the Com-
mission to grant exceptions where appropriate.) Third, front-end loads were to
be cut back substantially so that, under contractual and installment plans, the
sales commission would be more nearly leveled off over the duration of the plan
rather than be loaded heavily during the first years of the plan. (The Commis-
sion's original bill proposed that front-end loads be abolished entirely.)
In addition to these three prime target areas, both the original bill and the
final Senate version contained numerous other provisions designed to facilitate
administration and enforcement of the Act in the interest of public investors,
to remove anomalies, inconsistencies and technical shortcomings which had been
revealed as the Act had been administered over the years, and to update and
improve certain provisions of it which had proved inadequate in their original
form. 8 The final Senate version also contained certain provisions requested by
the banking industry with respect to commingled managing agency accounts
and provisions as to both banks and insurance companies dealing with collective
trust funds and separate accounts maintained to handle certain types of stock
bonus, pension and profit-sharing plans - provisions which were not in the
original bill.
Finally, it should be noted that the significance of the bills which were
introduced and extensively considered in the ninetieth Congress consists not
only of the breadth of their substantive provisions but also of the fact that they,
or close cousins of theirs, are apparently destined for further serious considera-
tion and possible passage in the ninety-first Congress which convened in January
of this year. The developments which took place in the ninetieth Congress in the
mutual fund reform area are certain to have a marked impact on what tran-
spires and emerges in the same area in the ninety-first Congress.
VIII. Developments to Date in the Ninety-first Congress
Shortly after the ninety-first Congress convened for its first session, Senator
John J. Sparkman introduced a bill which is exactly like the one that the Senate
passed in the ninetieth Congress (S. 3724). His bill is S. 34. It was introduced
on January 15, 1969 and was referred that same day to the Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency of which Senator Sparkman continues to be the Chairman."
The very next day Senator Thomas J. McIntyre ° introduced S. 296 which was
38 On the same day that the "reform" bills were introduced, SEC Investment Company
Act, Release No. 4942 (May 1, 1967) was issued, stating their principal features. This
Release is reprinted in 113 CONG. REc. 11531 (May 3, 1967). It recites the content of the
proposed legislation in considerably more detailed fashion than is possible here, but it must
be borne in mind that the Release relates to the Commission's original proposals, not to the
bill which was ultimately passed by the Senate.
39 115 CONG. REc. S221 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1969).
40 Senator McIntyre is a member of the Banking and Currency Committee and was much
in the forefront when the ninetieth Congress was considering mutual fund reform legislation.
In fact, he proposed to offer a series of amendments to S. 1659, the Commission's original
bill (113 CONG. REc. S16284 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1967)), which led to certain of the sub-
stantial changes which occurred as that bill evolved into the revised S. 3724, the bill finally
passed by the Senate - particularly changes and additions in the area of a bank "common
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likewise referred to the Banking and Currency Committee.41 This bill differs
from the one sponsored by Senator Sparkman in only three respects. First, it
would go all the way in abolishing front-end loads. Second, it would not limit
the authority of the Commission to enjoin breaches of fiduciary duty by persons
identified with investment companies in certain named capacities to breaches
involving "personal misconduct." (Both of these differences are in keeping with
the Commission's original proposals in the ninetieth Congress.) Third, the Mc-
Intyre bill would repeal entirely the present section 22(d) of the Act, a provision
which has provoked considerable controversy because it has the effect of stifling
competition in commission rates charged for the sale of mutual fund shares.
This feature of the McIntyre bill varies from the Sparkman bill, which would
give the National Association of Securities Dealers authority to regulate sales
commissions to prevent "an excessive sales load" by rules which would be subject
to specified scrutiny and review by the Commission. This feature also varies from
the Commission's original bill which would have put a flat ceiling of five per
cent on sales commissions. From the standpoint of the public investor there is
obviously something to be said for the McIntyre approach to this subject as
against either the original proposal or the Sparkman bill. The latter is, how-
ever, undoubtedly more palatable to the industry than either of the other two.
IX. Conclusion
Although there will very likely be further developments, including con-
gressional hearings, before this article appears in print, they may not occur
to any significant extent before the deadline for going to press.42 The probability
trust fund or other pooled or collective fund maintained by a bank." - See Amendments In-
tended to be Proposed by Mr. McIntyre to S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 13, 1967.
41 115 CONG. REc. S424 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1969).
42 Since this article was originally written there have been three noteworthy developments
in the ninety-first Congress:
1. On March 6, 1969 SEC Chairman Hamer H. Budge testified before the Sub-
committee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on
a number of matters of current concern to the Commission. A substantial portion
of his testimony, that captioned "Mutual Fund Legislation," consisted largely
of a discussion of the differences between the Commission's original bill in the
ninetieth Congress and the present S. 34. His conclusion was that the Commission
bill "might more effectively ensure fair treatment to investment company share-
holders" but that "enactment of S. 34 would accomplish a great improvement
over the present situation and would constitute an important reform" and that
"if this Committee prefers to accept S. 34, I would gladly accept that decision
and support that bill." Statement of Hamer H. Budge before the Subcommittee
on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Certain
Questions Arising under the Federal Securities Laws 30, March 6, 1969 (on file
with the Notre Dame Lawyer).
2. On March 13, 1969 Congressman Williamson S. Stuckey, Jr. introduced H.R.
8980 in the House of Representatives and made a statement on the floor of the
House explaining the principal differences between his bill and the Commission's
bill in the ninetieth Congress. According to his own statement these differences
are mainly a reflection of his view that the management, as well as distribution
and sales organization and personnel, of mutual funds should be subject to less
scrutiny by the SEC and the courts, particularly as to management fees and
sales loads, and that certain restrictions should be placed on suits brought against
them by both the Commission and private plaintiffs. 115 Cong. Rec. H1727-28
(daily ed., March 13, 1969).
3. On April 15, 1969 the full Senate Committee on Banking and Currency com-
menced hearings on S. 34 and S. 296. The Committee called as its first witness
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of enactment of a reasonably effective bill, patterned in substantial part after one
or more of the bills considered in the ninetieth Congress and thus far introduced
in the ninety-first Congress, is anyone's guess. Perhaps the strongest affirmative
indications are the promptness with which the principal advocates of such legisla-
tion on the Senate side of Congress put the wheels in motion shortly after the
ninety-first Congress convened, and the remarks which they made on the floor of
the Senate when they introduced their bills on this subject.
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Presently there does not appear to be quite the same unanimity as was
evidenced back in 1940 when investment companies seemed about to "die on the
vine" and therefore understandably wanted some form of federal regulation at once
in order to restore public confidence. There is, however, a frank recognition on
the part of the industry that, after nearly twenty-nine years during which it has
grown by almost unbelievable leaps and bounds, the time has come when some
updating and improving are needed in the basic Act which regulates investment
companies. A single incident will perhaps serve to illustrate this point. On
January 23, 1969 John C. Bogle, President of the Wellington Management
Company, was installed as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Investment Company Institute. In his remarks on that occasion, after noting
that currently there are seven areas of major importance to their industry, he
continued by stating:
It is obvious that the most important issue coming before us is the Mutual
Fund Bill. As Institute President Augenblick has said, "the issues raised by
this Bill will not go away .... Our Institute has never taken the position
that after 28 years without amendment the Investment Company Act of
1940 should be left as it is." I agree wholeheartedly with his thinking, and
the implicit conclusion: that we should bend our efforts to resolving promptly
the issues that remain, so that the form the mutual fund legislation takes
will be constructive and will foster our industry's sound growth rather than
obstruct it. Sooner or later, we are going to have a mutual fund bill, and
I hope I can make a constructive contribution ....
During the course of the ninety-first Congress we may witness a repetition of
the industry-government cooperative endeavors which produced the original Act
senior Commissioner Hugh F. Owens who testified in the absence of Chairman
Budge. Commissioner Owens noted that S. 34 contains significant compromises
as against the Commission's original bill in the ninetieth Congress. He readily
conceded that these compromises do not entirely satisfy industry objections, but
stated: "I respectfully submit that no further compromises in S. 34 are necessary."
Testimony of Hugh F. Owens on S. 34 before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency 11, April 15, 1969 (on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer; ultimately
available in printed form in the record of these Hearings). He expressed some
misgivings about the provision in S. 296 which would repeal section 22(d) of the
Act, the section which provides retail price maintenance for mutual fund shares,
and placed the Commission squarely on record as supporting S. 34. Id.
43 While the remarks of Senator McIntyre were directed largely to the subject of re-
moving from the Act any barrier to allowing sales commissions to be determined by unre-
stricted competition, he and Senator Sparkman are both apparently intent upon securing
mutual fund reform legislation during the present session of Congress. See 115 CONG. REC.
S289-90 (remarks of Senator Sparkman), S430-31 (remarks of Senator McIntyre) (daily ed.
Jan. 15 & 16, 1969). A portion of Senator Sparkman's statement is particularly significant. He
told his fellow Senators that "ihe Banking and Currency Committee of which I am chair-
man intends to give these proposals prompt consideration so that a bill may be reported to the
Senate at the earliest possible date." Id. at S290.
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in 1940, but which this time would have the added significance of further serving
the best interests of over five million Americans who today look to mutual fund
shares for the investment of many billions of dollars of their lifetime savings.
We are today concerned with a situation of vastly greater proportions and much
more importance to the investing public than that which prevailed on the eve
of the 1940 Act, when only a few hundred thousand of our people had a little
over one billion dollars at stake in all types of investment companies combined.
